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Do Currency Unions Deliver More Economic Integration than Fixed Exchange Rates?
Evidence from the CFA and the ECCU 
1. Introduction
Over the last decade, many countries have chosen to adopt “hard” exchange rate pegs, or to become 
part of an international monetary union (Ghosh et al., 1995). These changes have renewed academic 
interest in the impact of the exchange rate regime and monetary union on international 
macroeconomic integration. Papers such as Artis and Zhang (1995), Christodoulakis et al. (1995), 
Fatas (1996) and Boone (1997) examine the impact of exchange rate pegs on the magnitude of 
business cycle correlations. These studies on the magnitude of the correlation of shocks run parallel 
to a literature on the impact of exchange rate regimes on the persistence of asymmetric shocks, and 
in particular on the persistence of deviations from PPP (for example, Lothian and Taylor, 1996, 
Papell, 1997 and Engel and Rogers, 2001). Evidence on the impact of complete monetary union is 
necessarily more limited – given the small number of countries that have adhered to a monetary 
union for any length of time – but Rose and Engel (2000) look at their impact on business cycle 
correlations and trade. 
  Overall, there appears to be some evidence to confirm the conjecture (as in for example 
Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996) that sharing a common currency, or alternatively adopting a hard 
exchange rate peg with one’s main trading partner, reduces international transactions costs and 
exchange rate risk, which promotes greater trade and hence also greater business cycle 
synchronicity. It also appears to insulate partner countries from speculative bubbles that lead to 
temporary and unnecessary fluctuations in the real exchange rate. However, there is some 
disagreement about the robustness of these results, as exemplified by the debate between Rose 
(2001) and Persson (2001). One worry is that evidence based on linear regression equations that 
incorporate an exchange rate regime dummy might suffer from bias because such equations do not 
adequately capture nonlinearities in the process determining the level of integration. 
  Whatever the strength of the results published so far, none of these papers directly addresses 
the question of whether the impact of full monetary union on macroeconomic integration differs 
from that of adopting a hard peg. This is of potential policy importance, because for some countries 
the administrative or political costs of joining a monetary union may be prohibitively high. If 
adopting a hard peg is a close macroeconomic substitute to complete monetary integration, the 
benefits of such integration are likely to be available to a wider range of nation states. 
Indeed, existing empirical papers provide very ambiguous evidence about the role of hard 
pegs versus the role of currency unions. Apart of the Europe-specific papers (none of which 
provides direct evidence on the impact of full monetary union, given the short time the EMU has 2
been in existence), a substantial part of the international evidence relies on the inclusion of 
observations from the world’s two long-lasting trans-national common currency areas: the CFA 
Franc Zone in Africa and the East Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). In panel and cross-section 
studies, these areas provide the bulk of observations for both fixed exchange rate regimes and
monetary unions.
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Using these currency areas as the basis for empirical evidence leaves to one side a 
potentially important point. The integration benefits to a small open economy from adhering to a 
currency union might arise not so much from the shared currency as from the common peg. So, for 
example, the increased integration between Puerto Rico and the Bahamas resulting from their 
dollarization, or between St. Lucia and Dominica resulting from their common use of the ECCU 
Dollar (which is pegged to the US Dollar), may be no greater than their integration with Barbados 
(which maintains a conventional peg against the US Dollar). The existing results from francophone 
countries are even more ambiguous. Typically, the CFA has been treated as a single currency union, 
when in fact it comprises two quite separate currencies, each issued by a different central bank and 
separately pegged to the French Franc (and now to the Euro). So, for example, Togo and Gabon (in 
different currency areas within the CFA) have been treated as members of the same currency union, 
but Togo and Mayotte (which uses the French Franc) have not. In fact, all three countries use 
different currencies, each exchangeable with the others at a fixed rate. 
This paper will address these ambiguities by looking at the degree of macroeconomic 
integration between countries in two areas of the world. First, we will examine pair-wise measures 
of integration between the nations of the CFA, all of which use one currency or another called the 
CFA Franc and pegged to the French Franc / Euro. Some of the pairs are made up of economies 
within the same monetary union, and others are cross-union pairings. Second, we will look at the 
same measures for a group of Caribbean countries, all of which use currencies pegged to the US 
Dollar. Some are members of the ECCU, some have dollarized national currencies and others 
maintain conventional independent pegs. 
The purpose of the comparisons is to see whether adhering to a common currency delivers a 
degree of integration over-and-above that resulting from adherence to a common peg. Some of the 
theoretical explanations for greater integration are based on currency transactions costs, and suggest 
that integration arises from full monetary union, rather than from a common peg. Others are based 
on exchange rate volatility and exchange risk, and suggest that (credible) adherence to a common 
peg might suffice.
2
1 For example, the data set employed by Rose and Engel (2000) includes 256 pairs of countries identified as sharing a 
currency, of which 120 are CFA or ECCU pairs. A further 116 are US Dollar or French Franc pairs. 
2 Even if the marginal effect of a common currency over a common peg is negligible, some countries might be able to 
adhere credibly to a peg only within a monetary union, because of the political fragility of domestic monetary 3
The next section provides a brief, non-technical survey of the possible reasons why 
monetary union might affect the degree of international economic integration. We will focus on 
three aspects of integration: trade intensity, the magnitude relative price volatility, or of deviations 
from PPP, and the degree of business cycle synchronization. Section 3 introduces the countries that 
will appear in our analysis. Section 4 then discusses the econometric framework that will be used in 
Section 5 to measure the degree of integration. The aim is to build a modelling framework based on 
realistic assumptions about the structure of the small open economies that form our sample, a 
structure rather different than that of the typical OECD economy. 
2. Monetary Union and Economic Integration
The existing literature suggests at least three aspects of international economic integration that 
could in principle be affected by membership of a monetary union as opposed to a fixed exchange 
rate.
(i)  The use of a common currency will eliminate transactions costs in international trade 
(De Grauwe, 2000), so trade volumes ought to increase. For one of the two regions we 
will be examining – the ECCU – this aspect of integration is not really relevant. Most of 
the Caribbean countries specialize in tourism and (to a lesser extent) cash crop 
production: areas in which there is little scope for intra-regional trade. Trade within the 
region makes up less than 10% of the total trade volume. For the CFA, however, intra-
regional trade is much more important. Trade between CFA countries and other LDCs 
makes up a substantial fraction of the total trade volume (in some cases, more than 50%: 
see Table 1). 
(ii)  Engel and Rogers (2001) identify a number of factors that determine the degree of real 
exchange rate volatility between pairs of countries. Nominal exchange rate volatility and 
physical distance turn out to be important factors, but there is also a substantial “pure” 
border effect. Controlling for all other factors, the ratio of prices in two regions is more 
volatile if the regions are located in different countries. Engel and Rogers suggest a 
number of explanations for this effect. Some of these, including the currency 
transactions costs mentioned above, but also factors such as international heterogeneity 
institutions. So monetary union can still be a significant factor in international integration, even if the only economic 
consequences of monetary union are those arising from the common peg. The political economy of monetary union is, 
however, beyond the scope of this paper. 4
in marketing and distribution systems, the scope for international price discrimination, or 
“informal” trade barriers, might be reduced if the countries shared a common currency.
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(iii)  As a consequence of increased trade, the degree of business cycle synchronicity between 
two countries in a monetary union might be higher, because aggregate demand shocks in 
one country have more of an impact on the other than they would otherwise; or it might 
be lower, because increased trade corresponds to increased specialization in types of 
production subject to different productivity shocks. But an increased volume of bilateral 
trade is not the only way in which a common currency could affect business cycle 
synchronicity. For example, if multinational firms have less scope for price 
discrimination between members of a monetary union (because price differences are 
more transparent and because the elimination of currency transactions costs facilitates 
arbitrage in goods), then international productivity shocks are likely to be passed on to 
local markets in a more uniform way. 
[Table 1 here] 
In this paper we will use data from our two regions to assess the extent to which membership of the 
same monetary union influences the degree of international macroeconomic integration, over and 
above a fixed exchange rate effect. We will measure integration in terms of (i) trade volumes (in the 
CFA only), (ii) real exchange rate volatility and (iii) business cycle synchronicity. The precise 
measures used will be discussed in Section 4.  
3. Monetary Union in Africa and the Caribbean 
3.1 The CFA Franc Zone
The CFA evolved from the monetary institutions of the last phase of French colonial Africa. Figure 1 
shows a map of the CFA region. It comprises two monetary areas, each with its own currency and 
central bank: the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), using currency issued by 
the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO); and the Central African Economic Area 
(UDEAC), using currency issued by the Bank of Central African States (BEAC). Both currencies are 
commonly called the CFA Franc, although they are entirely separate monetary units. 
  The countries that make up the CFA, and their basic economic structure, are summarised in 
Tables 2-3. The boundaries between the different monetary areas have a geographical and historical 
basis, and each of the two monetary unions (the BCEAO and BEAC regions) comprises a wide range 
of economies. The BCEAO region includes both semi-industrialised economies with a high export-
3 For example, traders’ lives will be made easier if they only have to hold one type of currency with which to bribe 
customs officials. 5
GDP ratio (such as Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal) and also some of the world’s poorest and 
underdeveloped countries (such as Burkina Faso and Mali). The BEAC region includes both countries 
that are equally underdeveloped (Chad, Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea) and 
relatively high-income petroleum exporters (Cameroon, Congo Republic and Gabon). 
  Each of the two currencies is exchangeable for the French Franc at a rate of 100:1 (and now at 
the equivalent Euro rate). The French Treasury is obliged to exchange CFA Francs for Euros at this 
fixed rate,
4 and there are rules limiting CFA government borrowing that are intended to prevent the 
African countries from abusing France’s guarantee of convertibility. However, France is not part of 
the CFA, and the only legal tender in each CFA country is the currency issued by its central bank. 
Foreign currency (including the other CFA currency) is not used as a unit of account or medium of 
exchange. Commercial banks do not typically offer customers foreign currency deposit facilities, and 
foreign currency deposits are a negligibly small fraction of total deposits. The exchange of one CFA 
currency for another (or of CFA Francs for Euros) must be conducted through the central bank and, 
and is subject to taxation, so intra-CFA currency transactions costs are not negligible (Vizy, 1989). 
[Figure 1 and Tables 2-3 here] 
The composition of the two monetary unions is a consequence of the French colonial organisation, 
and is therefore exogenous to contemporary economic characteristics. The current grouping into two 
currency areas dates from 1955 (seven years before full political independence, at which point the 
countries were self-governing French overseas territories), and arises from the distinction between 
French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa in the colonial period. As can be seen from the map, 
this division is based on the physical geography of the region. The only point of physical contact 
between the UEMOA and the UDEAC is the Chad-Niger border, which lies in the Sahara Desert far 
from any major centers of population. Further south, the two areas are separated by Nigeria, a former 
British colony that has no part in the CFA. The CFA comprises those Sub-Saharan African countries 
occupied by France at the end of WW1.
5 There have been just two exits from the CFA, neither of 
which is likely to have been correlated with the countries’ economic characteristics. In 1958, at the 
institution of the Fifth French Republic, all overseas territories participated in a referendum on the 
new constitution. Guinea-Conakry, which happened to have a socialist government at the time, was 
the only colony to reject this constitution, and severed all political and financial links with France. In 
1973, after full independence, Mauritania (the only Arab country in the area) also exited the CFA, 
preferring to pursue an identity as a North African Arab state. There have also been just two entries: 
Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. These countries were, respectively, Spanish and Portugese 
4 In effect, France pegs the Euro to the CFA currencies. Monetary policy in the CFA is constrained not by the need to 
maintain an exchange rate peg, but by (very lax) rules limiting domestic credit creation.  6
colonies; they are completely surrounded by, respectively, UDEAC and UEMOA nations, and joined 
the appropriate monetary union in 1985 and 1997. The only other countries surrounded by the CFA 
(Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) are all English-speaking. All but Liberia were 
British colonies, and up until now it has been made clear that they are not welcome to join the 
francophone monetary area. 
  In this paper we will focus on those 12 of the 14 members of the CFA for which adequate 
macroeconomic data are available: Benin (designated ben in the tables), Cote d’Ivoire (civ), Mali 
(mli), Niger (ner), Senegal (sen) and Togo (tgo) in the BCEAO area and Cameroon (cam), Central 
African Republic (car), Chad (tcd), Congo Republic (cgo) and Gabon (gab) in the BEAC region.
6 If 
sharing a common currency delivers an additional degree of integration over-and-above that arising 
from the common currency peg, then we should see a greater degree of integration within each of the 
two monetary unions than we do across the BCEAO-BEAC border, conditional on other, exogenous 
economic characteristics. 
3.2 The ECCU and other Dollar-pegging Caribbean countries
The East Caribbean Currency Union is made up of eight island economies. Adequate data are 
available for the analysis of macroeconomic shocks in six of these: Antigua and Barbuda (atg),
Dominica (dma), Grenada (grd), St. Kitts and Nevis (ktn), St. Lucia (lca) and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines (vct).
7 As with the CFA, this currency union owes its existence to colonial history: the 
member states formed Britain’s colonial possessions in the Eastern Caribbean. Spanish and French-
speaking islands are excluded. Members share a single central bank issuing the ECCU Dollar, pegged 
to the US Dollar at a fixed rate. Proximity to the USA and a large amount of tourism mean that US 
Dollars also circulate in these countries. However, the use of the ECCU Dollar as a unit of account 
and as a medium of exchange by all of the (sizeable) public sectors institutions across the islands 
ensures that the domestic private sector must deal largely in the local currency. In December 2000, for 
example, private sector foreign currency deposits in the ECCU made up only 15.7% of total private 
sector bank deposits. This is not significantly different from the equivalent figure for OECD 
countries: the ratio for Great Britain in the same period was 13.3%.
8 The ECCU-US$ exchange rate 
has remained fixed for many years, but re-pegging is not impossible. Indeed, the currency was 
originally pegged to UK Sterling. In this sense, membership of the ECCU does not entail a currency 
union with the USA, and the ECCU countries are not dollarized. 
5 Excepting Djibouti, which is thousands of miles away in the Horn of Africa. 
6 The two countries lacking adequate data are Guinea-Bissau in the BCEAO region and Equatorial Guinea in the BEAC 
region. 
7 The two other ECCU members are Aruba and Montserrat. 
8 The figures come from the central bank websites: www.eccb-centralbank.org and bankofengland.co.uk. 7
  Many other Caribbean countries have maintained a peg against the US Dollar at one time or 
another. However, there are just two sizeable economies that have avoided a flexible exchange rate 
regime from independence through to the 21
st century: the Bahamas (bhs), and Barbados (brb), plus 
two Central American economies: Belize (blz) and Panama (pan). In the case of the Bahamas and 
Panama, the fact that the peg has been retained for so long is a result of geo-political factors,
9 and the 
two countries are completely dollarized, with no separate currency of their own. Barbados and Belize 
have maintained conventional fixed pegs against the US Dollar. If sharing a common currency 
delivers an additional degree of integration over-and-above that arising from the common currency 
peg, then we should see a greater degree of integration within the ECCU than we do between ECCU 
countries and the other four countries, conditional on other, exogenous economic characteristics.  
Note that we will not be looking at the degree of integration between each of the small open 
economies and the large economy issuing the anchor currency. Our econometric methodology is 
based on the assumption that foreign prices are exogenous, an assumption valid only for a small open 
economy.
4. Testing for the Marginal Effect of Adhering to a Common Currency
Our basic methodology is similar to that of Rose and Engel (2000), but with different dependent 
variables and a different data set. The extent of macroeconomic integration between two countries 
might depend on a variety of factors other than their currency institutions. So our approach is to 
construct a fixed-effects regression for different measures of integration in any two countries i and j,
conditional on both a common currency dummy (ifsij) and a set of exogenous conditioning 
variables.
In the empirical section that follows we will employ four different measures of integration. 
The first is the total value of bilateral trade between two countries, in millions of dollars (Tij). This 
corresponds to integration concept (i) in Section 2. Tij ought to be higher in countries sharing the 
same currency. The second, in the spirit of Engel and Rogers (2001), is a measure of unconditional 
real exchange rate volatility, that is, the standard deviation of the (log) ratio of annual consumer 
price indices in i and j over the period for which data are available (Sij). This corresponds to 
integration concept (ii) in Section 2. Sij ought to be lower in countries sharing the same currency. 
  However, one might question whether this unconditional measure of volatility is the most 
appropriate for our purposes. In the short run (i.e., over a period shorter than that in which arbitrage 
guarantees PPP), prices could vary in response to a wide variety of macroeconomic factors. For 
example, in the CFA the two different central banks can each pursue an active monetary policy. 
9 Panama shared a land border with the USA until the latter ceded the Canal Zone in 2000; the Bahamas are only a few 
miles from the coast of Florida. 8
Interest parity with France does not hold in the short run, and the differential between each central 
bank’s base rate and that of the European Central Bank varies over time; so does the differential 
between the interest rates in the two parts of the CFA. The Euro-CFA Franc peg is guaranteed by 
the French Treasury, so short-run monetary policy in the CFA is not constrained by the need to 
maintain the peg. Idiosyncratic innovations in monetary policy could generate price deviations. Two 
countries in different currency areas might exhibit a large degree of unconditional real exchange 
rate volatility not because using different currencies creates underlying structural asymmetries, but 
just because the two monetary authorities are following different policies. Conditioning out the 
monetary shocks might give a more informative indicator of the degree of underlying 
macroeconomic integration. 
So an alternative way of measuring the degree to which prices in two countries are tied 
together is to estimate the size of annual price changes conditional on short-run factors like changes 
in the money supply, and then to look at the extent of correlation between the price innovations in 
two countries. In other words, we need a macro-econometric model incorporating a real exchange 
rate equation. In the case of the CFA, such a model is provided by Fielding and Shields (2001), who 
construct a structural VAR model that provides estimates of the innovations in domestic prices in CFA 
countries, conditional on growth in output, money and foreign prices.
10 We use these estimates for our 
CFA sample; we also replicate the model with Caribbean country data. For the sake of brevity, we do 
not discuss the model in detail here. Its econometric rationale is similar in spirit to that of Blanchard 
and Quah (1989), but with a different underlying economic structure, based on assumptions that are 
more realistic for a small open economy. We assume that in the long run, inflation rates in the each 
country in the CFA will converge on French inflation,
11 and inflation rates in each Caribbean 
country on US inflation. However, short run movements in real output and in the money supply can 
generate fluctuations in prices around the level consistent with PPP with OECD countries. In 
addition to these fluctuations, there are also short-run innovations in domestic prices, estimated as 
forecast errors in the model. If sharing a common currency ties countries’ prices together more 
closely than does a fixed exchange rate (conditional on money and output shocks), then these 
innovations should be more closely correlated between members of a monetary union than they are 
between countries that just happen to peg to the same OECD currency. The innovation correlation 
coefficient, Vij
'p, is our third measure of integration. 
The econometric model is also used to construct the fourth measure of integration: the 
degree of business cycle synchronicity, corresponding to concept (iii) in Section 2. Here we are 
concerned with the measurement of the extent to which aggregate supply and aggregate demand 
10 However, this paper does not explore the factors that might explain the cross-country correlations in price 
innovations. 9
shocks in one country are passed on to another. Again, we wish to condition on monetary policy: in 
the long run, money is neutral, but in the short run money shocks can impact on output. So the 
output shocks are measured as innovations in the output equation in the model. The correlation 
coefficient for this second type of innovation, Vij
'y, is our fourth measure of integration. 
5. Empirical Results 
This section is divided into three parts. The first presents the results of estimating equation (1) using 
the trade intensity measure of integration (measure i in Section 2); the second presents the results of 
using unconditional real exchange rate volatility  (measure ii); the third presents the results of using the 
estimated price and output innovation correlations (measures iii and iv). 
  We have two samples for use with the four alternative dependent variables. The first is made 
up of the 66 country pairs among the 12 CFA countries. The second is made up of the 45 country 
pairs among 10 Caribbean and Central American countries. In the CFA sample, ifsij = 1 in 31 cases 
(when both countries are in the BCEAO area, or both are in the BEAC area); in the Caribbean 
sample, ifsij = 1 in 15 cases (when both countries are ECCU members). The data used to construct 
the conditioning variable (i-iv in Section 3) are taken from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators.
5.1 The impact of a common currency on trade intensity 
In this case, we present results only for the CFA sample, since the volume of trade among the 
Caribbean countries is a very small fraction of their total trade. The regression for trade intensity is 
based on an equation of the form: 
ij ij ij j i ij u X ifs D D f T     ) , , , ( ) 1 ln(                          (1)
uij is a residual, and Xij a vector of conditioning variables. Di is a dummy variable for the i
th country. 
It turns out that country-specific effects have a large part to play in predicting trade intensity, and it 
might not necessarily be the case that the economic characteristics contained in the X-vector fully 
capture these effects. In other words, we will allow for unobserved country-specific characteristics 
to affect Tij. These characteristics might incorporate a range of factors. For example, Rose and van 
Wincoop (2001) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) suggest that it is important to take account 
of the magnitude of each country’s barriers to trade with all its trading partners, a factor difficult to 
measure in our sample of countries with very limited fiscal data. 
11 Evidence for this is cited in Fielding and Shields (2001). 10
 The  X-vector comprises a number of economic characteristics. To the extent that integration 
is a function of the volume of bilateral trade flows, the explanatory variables in “gravity” models of 
international trade will enter into X:
(i)  The log-product of the two countries’ total initial GDP (in US Dollars): yi·yj





(iii)  The log-product of their land surface areas (in km
2): ai·aj
(iv)  A dummy variable for whether the countries share a land border: ifbij
(v)  The logarithm of the Great Circle distance between their capital cities (in radians): distij
(vi)  A dummy variable for whether the two countries have a maritime coastline: ifcij
Figures for (i-iii) are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators. However, these 
conditioning variables might also affect the magnitude of macroeconomic integration for other 
reasons. For example, larger or more developed countries might be less susceptible to speculative 
behavior that induces unanticipated deviations in the real exchange rate; so real exchange rate 
volatility might be lower. In this paper, we do not attempt to identify the channels through which 
the conditioning variables impact on our macroeconomic integration measures. 
 The  ifsij dummy appears in equation (1) in order to capture the possibility that sharing a 
common currency (rather than just having a fixed exchange rate) reduces transactions costs in 
international trade, as outlined in section 2 above. In this sense, it has a role similar to the variables 
in the equation reflecting the determinants of international transport costs: ifbij, distij and ifcij. A 
simple version of equation (1) might treat the four cost variables as linearly separable arguments of 
f(). However, in the light of comments by, for example, Persson (2001), the linearity assumption is 
questionable. The magnitude of the impact of a common currency on trade between two countries 
could depend on the size of transport costs, if only because larger transport costs could increase the 
size of the currency transactions involved, ceteris paribus. But also, the magnitude of informal 
barriers to trade might depend on the two elements of costs – for transport and for currency 
transactions – in a more complex way. For this reason, a more appropriate form of equation (1) will 
include terms interacting ifsij with the other cost variables: 
ij ij ij ij ij
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where ij ij ifc ifs   = 1 if either  ij ifs = 1 or if   ij ifc = 1 and zero else. ifsij is not interacted with ifbij
because there is only one case of a land border between a UEMOA country and a UDEAC country 11
(Niger and Chad). Of course, we do not know a priori whether we have successfully captured all 
the relevant non-linearities in this way. So testing the validity of this functional form will be an 
important part of the econometric exercise. 
[Tables 4-5 here] 
The regression results are presented in Table 4. For each explanatory variable, the estimated 
coefficient is reported alongside the corresponding standard error (using White’s correction for 
heteroskedasticity), “h.c.s.e.”, the resulting t-ratio and the corresponding partial R
2. In these 
regressions the Tij figures used are taken from IMF DOTS for 1997. The table includes two 
regression equations. The first is the unrestricted equation (1a); the second is a more parsimonious 
form in which some conditioning variable coefficients have been set to zero so as to minimize the 
Akaike Criterion. (This criterion, AIC, along with the Schwartz and Hannon-Quinn Criteria, SC and 
HC, is reported at the bottom of the table.) Those coefficients that are statistically significant in the 
unrestricted equation do not change substantially in the restricted one, so we are reasonably 
confident that our inferences are robust to the inclusion of nuisance parameters in the model. Table 
5 includes a test for the validity of the functional form that we have chosen. This is a Ramsey 
RESET test for adding powers of the fitted residuals up to the fourth order to the regression 
equation. In neither the unrestricted nor the restricted version of the equation can we reject the null 
that the functional form we have chosen is an adequate description of the data. 
The table shows that the most important factor explaining trade intensity, aside from country 
fixed effects, is whether two countries share a land border. The point estimate in the unrestricted 
equation is 1.53. That is, countries sharing a land border have a volume of trade that is over 150% 
higher than trade with more distant countries, ceteris paribus. There is also a negative coefficient on 
the distance variable (-0.68), and a positive coefficient on the per capita income variable (0.61), 
although these become statistically significant only in the restricted equation. 
Finally, there is a positive coefficient on the interaction term  ij ij ifc ifs   that is significantly 
different from zero, but not from unity. In other words, if two countries either both have a coastline 
or both share the same currency, their trade volume is about twice as high as otherwise. Neither ifsij
alone nor ifcij alone has a significant impact on trade. One interpretation of this effect is that using a 
different currency is a substantial barrier to trade in landlocked countries only. Landlocked 
countries rely on their maritime neighbours – neighbours in the same currency area – for the 
transportation of imports and exports. The inland countries generally face higher transport costs. It 
seems that the combination of currency transaction costs and relatively high transport costs is 
enough to inhibit trade, but either of these two effects alone is not in itself large enough to have a 12
significant impact on trade volumes. In other words, the benefit of sharing a single currency, over 
and above any benefit of a fixed exchange rate, depends on geographical location. 
5.2 The impact of a common currency on unconditional real exchange rate volatility 
In this section we discuss the results of the corresponding regression equations for the real exchange 
rate volatility measure, Sij. For this measure of integration, we require a different regression equation 
with different conditioning variables. The degree of variation in relative prices across two countries is 
likely to depend on the degree of heterogeneity in their production structures, and the degree of 
correlation in the external price shocks that they face. It might also depend on their geographical 
proximity, if variations in local prices depend on variations in local climate, or if the strength of 
international commodity arbitrage in the short run depends on transportation costs between markets. So 
our regression equation is of the form: 
ij ij ij ij ij
ij j i j i j j i i ij
u ifs ifc dist ifb
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    
       
4 3 2 1
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K K K K
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                   (2)
Sij is measured as a standard deviation using the time-series price data described in Section 5.3. gi is the 
ratio of agricultural value added to GDP in country i, di is the ratio of industrial value added to GDP, 
and the transformation f(x) = log(1+x) – log(1-x) ensures that the explanatory variables are 
approximately normally distributed. ctotij is the correlation of the terms of trade in country i with that 
in country j. All figures are based on annual data for 1970-1999 from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators. In the light of the discussion in section 2 above, it is also conceivable that Sij
will depend on Tij; however, the trade variable was never statistically significant in IV estimates of 
equation (2). Again, it will be important to test for the validity of this functional form. 
[Table 6 here] 
Table 6 reports the regression results using Sij as the dependent variable. The first half of the table 
relates to the regression equation for the CFA zone; the second half relates to the regression equation 
for the ECCU and its neighbors. The table shows that in the first case (the CFA), the only significant 
factors (other than fixed effects) is the monetary union dummy ifsij. The estimated coefficient on the 
monetary union dummy is –0.3, so countries sharing the same currency can be expected to have a 
standard deviation of relative prices that is about 30% lower, ceteris paribus. The RESET test statistics 
in Table 5 indicate that there are no substantial non-linearities biasing these results: the size of the 
monetary union effect does not depend on other economic characteristics.  
  The same cannot be said for the ECCU sample. When a regression taking the form of equation 
(2) was fitted to the Caribbean data, the RESET test statistics was greater than the 5% critical value. 13
The reason for this is that in the Caribbean the size of the single currency effect depends on the 
distance between the two countries: there is a large and statistically significant coefficient on the 
interaction term ifsij·distij. Once such a term is added to the regression equation, there is no other sign 
of non-linearity. Table 6 therefore reports the amended version of the equation. The estimated 
coefficients imply that a 10% increase in distance increases the standard deviation of relative prices by 
a factor of 0.074, if the two countries use different currencies. If, however, the two countries are part of 
the ECCU, the increase is only by a factor of 0.02 (which is not significantly different from zero). In 
addition, at any given distance, ECCU membership reduces the standard deviation of relative prices by 
a factor of 1.50. Differences in economic structure, as captured by |di – dj| and |gi – gj|, appear not to 
matter in the Caribbean. When Caribbean countries share a single currency, they avoid the 
asymmetries in price movements that are usually associated with greater distance. One explanation for 
this effect might be that the monetary union, either through lower currency transactions costs, or 
through proactive policy, mitigates the weakening of international arbitrage in goods as distance 
increases.
One drawback of the exchange rate volatility measure Sij is that it does not control for the fact 
that members of a monetary union may happen to have experienced common shocks to aggregate 
demand that increase the correlation of prices, but do not reflect a greater degree of underlying 
integration. For this reason, we now turn to the analysis of our second price volatility measure, Vij
'p.
5.3 The impact of a common currency on price and output innovation correlations 
In this sub-section we will present estimates of cross-country correlations of the innovations to prices 
and output, Vij
'p and Vij
'y, for both the CFA and the ECCU and its neighbors. The innovations have 
been derived from a structural VAR incorporating three dependent variables, 'p (the growth rate of 
the consumer price index), 'y (the growth rate of real GDP at market prices) and 'm (the growth rate 
of M1), conditional on the exogenous rate of growth of foreign prices. Annual data for these variables 
are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators. The annual data run from 1966 to 
1997. Fitting this model to the data facilitates the recovery of structural innovations in 'p and 'y,
conditional on shocks to money growth and foreign prices. In other words, we can estimate that part of 
shocks to output and prices that is not to do with idiosyncratic monetary policy or exogenous shocks to 
international prices. To the extent that adhering to a common currency delivers extra insulation from 
real exchange rate fluctuations (over-and-above that provided by a common peg), we ought to find that 
pairs of countries using a common currency exhibit a higher Vij
'p than pairs using different currencies, 
and greater similarity in the dynamic response to the price innovations. To the extent that adhering to a 
common currency delivers extra macroeconomic integration, the same ought to be true of Vij
'y. First of 14
all, we present descriptive statistics on real exchange rate and output shocks in the CFA and the 
Caribbean. Then we construct formal tests of the hypotheses above. 
5.3.1 Estimation and description of price and output shocks in the CFA
Table 7 shows the cross-country correlation coefficients for the estimated innovations to 'p and 'y.
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These are the variables Vij
'p and Vij
'y to be used in our cross-country regressions. In the correlation 
matrix, the 'p correlations are shown below the main diagonal and the 'y correlations above. The 'p
innovations are typically very highly correlated across all of the CFA, even across the BCEAO-BEAC 
border. Most are significantly greater than zero at the 1% level. So, for example, the correlation 
coefficient for real exchange rate shocks to the Central African Republic (car) and Senegal (sen) is 
97%. 
We will leave until later the question of whether the correlations within the BCEAO region and 
within the BEAC region are greater than those across the two currency areas, conditional on each 
country’s economic characteristics. But a cursory glance at Table 7 reveals that some countries have 
significantly lower correlation coefficients with all other CFA members, regardless of the currency 
they use. As Table 8 indicates, there is a “core” group of 8 CFA members (Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, 
Togo and Mali in the BCEAO region; Cameroon, Congo Republic, Gabon and the Central African 
Republic in the BEAC region) whose average value of Vij
'p is 92%. If the group is expanded to 
incorporate the other four CFA members (Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger in the BCEAO region and 
Chad in the BEAC region), then the average correlation coefficient falls to 76%. In other words, there 
are substantial country-specific factors affecting the degree of correlation in addition to any effect of 
sharing a common currency. 
[Tables 7-8 here] 
Table 7 also lists correlation coefficients for the output innovations. These exhibit rather more 
heterogeneity than the real exchange rate shocks. As indicated in Table 8, there are two groups of 
countries within which correlations are positive and reasonably large. These are (i) the BCEAO 
countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Togo, and Niger, plus the BEAC countries Cameroon, Gabon, 
Central African Republic and Chad; (ii) the BCEAO counties Cote d’Ivoire and Mali, plus the BEAC 
country Congo Republic. However, all correlations across these two groups are negative. Again, 
country-specific effects play a large role in predicting the size of correlations. It remains to be seen 
whether membership of the same monetary union has any marginal impact on these correlation 
coefficients. Moreover, country-specific effects for output shocks differ from country-specific effects 
for real exchange rate shocks: the membership of the core price groups in Table 8 cuts across the core 
12 In the case of the CFA, the figures in Table 7 are taken from Fielding and Shields (2001). 15
output groups. This is not inconsistent with possible explanations for the degree of correlation between 
output shocks on the one hand and real exchange rate shocks on the other. For example, the degree of 
similarity in real exchange rate shocks might be dominated by the extent of price inertia. (The four real 
exchange rate “outsiders” are all among the most underdeveloped countries in the CFA; three are in the 
Sahel.) The degree of similarity in output shocks might be dominated by completely different factors, 
such as the structure of production. But it does suggest that adherence to a common currency is by no 
means the only factor driving the size of Vij
'p and Vij
'y.
5.3.2 Estimation and description of price and output shocks in the Caribbean
Figures for 'p and 'y in the Caribbean countries are taken from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators. The number of the annual observations available varies from one country to another, with 
the earliest reported figures in 1960 and the latest in 2000. However, there are at least 30 observations 
for all 10 countries. 
  The bottom part of Table 7 shows the sample cross-country correlation coefficients for the 
estimated structural innovations to 'p and 'y. In the correlation matrix, the 'p correlations are shown 
below the main diagonal and the 'y correlations above. The Caribbean Vij
'p values are typically rather 
smaller than the corresponding CFA ones, even when the sample is restricted to the ECCU countries 
alone. Overall, this is a more heterogeneous group than the African one. As shown in the bottom half 
of Table 8, there is a core of 5 countries for which the average real exchange rate innovation 
correlation is 52%: Antigua, Dominica and Grenada in the ECCU, plus Barbados and Belize outside. 
Adding in St. Kitts and Panama reduces the average to 38%; adding in the other three countries reduces 
the average even further. In other words, there is a substantial amount of unanticipated real exchange 
rate variation across the Caribbean countries, as well as between each country and the USA. Again, 
country-specific effects appear to be important. Moreover, the degree of correlation of real exchange 
rate shocks for the ECCU as a whole is substantially less than the corresponding degree of correlation 
in the CFA area. 
  These remarks are also true of the estimated output innovation correlations. If one excludes 
Panama, then the average correlation coefficient for the remaining 9 countries is greater than zero, but 
only 30% of the individual coefficients are statistically significant. Even within the ECCU, there are 
many pairs of countries with negative or insignificant correlations. Still, we have yet to see whether 
adhering to the ECCU has a marginally positive impact on the degree of correlation, ceteris paribus.
Neither is there an obvious pattern relating the size of the cumulative impulse responses to 
membership of the ECCU (bottom half of Table 8). In the first column, for example, there are both 
ECCU and non-ECCU countries with relatively small cumulative impulse responses (for example, 
Grenada and Belize), and both ECCU and non-ECCU countries with relatively large responses (for 16
example, Antigua and the Bahamas). The middle column, representing the cumulative impact of 
shocks to the real exchange rate on output, shows positive responses in some of the ECCU and non-
ECCU countries, and negative responses in others. As in the CFA, country-specific effects appear to 
dominate any monetary union effect in inducing similarity in dynamic responses to shocks. 
5.3.3 Estimates of the impact of a common currency on innovation correlations
For each sample we estimate two regressions of the form given in equation (2), one for Vij
'p and one 
for Vij
'y. The regression results are reported in Tables 9-10. We use logistic transformations of the 
correlation coefficients, so that the distributions of the dependent variables are unbounded. 
  The first parts of the two tables report the CFA regressions. For Vij
'p the regression results 
are rather different from those for Sij. There are two differences between the equations. First, the 
border dummy ifbij is significant in the Vij
'p regression. Countries sharing a common border have 
higher values of Vij
'p. The point estimate on the dummy is 0.18. In other words, neighboring 
countries can be expected to have a conditional price correlation that is about 18% higher than for 
more distant country pairs. Secondly, the monetary union dummy ifsij is statistically insignificant in 
the Vij
'p regression. In other words, if we condition out that part of price changes due to exogenous 
shocks to foreign prices, or to shocks to domestic money supply and output, the correlations in price 
changes across countries do not depend on whether two counties are part of the same monetary 
union. As we will see below, cross-country correlations in output shocks are independent of ifsij,
and the foreign price shocks are common to all CFA countries. So the reason for the difference 
between the two equations lies in the monetary shocks. Price movements in countries within a 
monetary union are more highly correlated with each other than they are with price movements in 
the countries of the other union; but this appears to be largely because countries within a monetary 
union are subject to a single central bank with a single monetary policy. There is no evidence for 
“deeper” market integration within a union. 
  We find a similar phenomenon in the Caribbean sample. The non-linear combination of distij
and ifsij that explained a large part of the variation in Sij across countries is not significant in the 
Vij
'p regression. In the linear regression equation reported in Table 9, there is no sign of any non-
linearity, and neither distij nor ifsij is statistically significant. The effects of monetary union 
membership are apparent only when we are looking at the correlation of unconditional price 
movements. 
  Table 10 shows that there is no evidence that membership of the same monetary union 
increases the extent of business cycle correlation, as measured by the correlation of output 
innovations in each country, Vij
'y. There is some evidence, at least in the Caribbean, that exogenous 
characteristics such as the structure of production do affect this correlation. In the Caribbean sample 17
the coefficient on f(| g i - gj |) is –0.097, which is significantly different from zero. The sample 
standard deviation of this variable is 1.154, so the estimated coefficient on this variable implies that 
two countries with an atypically high difference in the structure of production (say, two standard 
deviations above the mean) can be expected to have an output innovation correlation that is about 22% 
lower than average. When one conditions the cross-country correlation of output shocks on these 
structural characteristics, the ifsij dummy plays no significant role. 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper we have explored the factors that determine the degree of macroeconomic integration 
in two areas of the world: the CFA Franc Zone and the Caribbean, including the East Caribbean 
Currency Union. All of the countries in our two samples have maintained a pegged exchange rate 
over the last 40 years (to the French Franc and US Dollar respectively). Some of them share the 
same currency. Our aim has been to see whether sharing a common currency delivers an extra 
degree of macroeconomic integration, as compared with sharing a common peg. Four indicators of 
integration are considered: trade intensity, unconditional real exchange rate volatility, and the 
correlation of innovations in domestic prices and real output. 
The evidence on the effect of a single currency is mixed. In the CFA, sharing a common 
currency is associated with substantially more bilateral trade, but only among the countries that are 
landlocked. This suggests that capacity of a single currency to reduce the barriers to trade is 
entwined with the countries’ geographical characteristics, which are important in determining the 
size of transportation costs. In both the CFA and the Caribbean, sharing a common currency is 
associated with substantially lower bilateral real exchange rate volatility. In the Caribbean the size 
of this effect depends on geographical location. For countries further apart, the effect is stronger. 
  However, the real exchange rate effects of a single currency disappear when one looks at the 
cross-country correlation of shocks to prices, that is, domestic price changes conditional on foreign 
(i.e., European or American) price changes, and on changes in domestic output and money. So the 
greater degree of correlation of prices within a monetary union probably results from a similarity in 
the pattern of changes in aggregate demand (and in particular, in monetary changes) rather than 
from greater market integration. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the members of a monetary 
experience a greater degree of business cycle convergence, when such convergence is measured in 
terms of the correlation of innovations in GDP. 
  Macroeconomic integration can be measured in a variety of different ways. For some – but 
not all – measures, sharing a single currency promotes more integration than can be expected in 
countries that just share the same currency peg. In order to decide whether the international policy 
co-ordination necessary for full monetary union is worth the effort, we need to know which kinds of 18
integration are the most relevant in evaluating social welfare. Even then, the size of the single 
currency effect will not be independent of the geographic and economic characteristics of the 
countries concerned.19
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Table 1: Trade Statistics for CFA Members 
Figures are for the most recent year available in IFS DOTS 
Country
Exports to LDCs 
(% Total Exports) 
Imports from LDCs 
(% Total Imports) 
Benin 06  29 
Burkina Faso  58  48 
Cameroon 28  33 
Centrafrique 18  31 
Chad 15  44 
Congo Republic  72  31 
Côte d’Ivoire  45  54 
Gabon 22  12 
Mali 45  64 
Niger 47  52 
Senegal 49  44 
Togo 80  69 
Table 2: Monetary Groupings in the CFA and the Caribbean 
Countries in italics are excluded from the econometric analysis because of 
inadequate data (i.e., the relevant economic time-series in World Bank World 
Development Indicators are incomplete). 
1. CFA Countries (2 separate currencies) 
UEMOA:   Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
  Senegal,  Togo 
UDEAC:  Cameroon, C.A.R., Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon 
2. Caribbean & Central American Countries (4 separate currencies)
ECCU:  Antigua & Barbuda, Aruba, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts & 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines 
Separate: Barbados,  Belize 
US$ pegs 
Dollarized: The Bahamas, Panama 21
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
ben bfa civ sen tgo mli ner cam cgo gab car tcd 
1987 agriculture value added (% GDP)  33.3 31.5 29.2 21.7 33.5 45.2 36.3 24.8 11.9 11 46.9 33.1 
1997 agriculture value added (% GDP)  38.4 31.8 27.3 18.5 42.2 44.0 38.0 42.1 9.5 7.5 54.1 37.4 
1987 total external debt (% GDP)  76.4 38.4 134.6 87.6 98.9 94.2 75.1 33.2 145.2 79.8 47.8 27.9 
1997 total external debt (% GDP)  75.9 54.5 152.3 81.0 89.2 119.9 88.7 101.9 227 67.5 92.3 54.9 
1987 exports (% GDP)  29.3 10.6 33.4 24.1 41.4 16.6 21.5 15.7 41.7 42.7 16.2 15.4 
1997 exports (% GDP)  24.9 11.2 46.6 32.8 34.7 25.5 16.2 26.8 77.0 64.0 19.5 18.7 
1985 gross investment (% GDP)  12.9 20.9 12.3 12.5 17.6 20.7 12.0 24.7 19.7 26.4 12.5 9.1 
1995 gross investment (% GDP)  18.5 27.0 16.0 18.7 14.9 20.6 10.8 16.2 26.0 26.3 9.0 16.3 
sample s.d. 'y (%)  4.5 4.0 6.3 3.8 7.4 5.3 9.0 5.7 6.9 9.0 4.2 11.4 
sample s.d. 'p (%) 8.0 8.1 6.8 7.9 8.0 10.0 9.1 7.2 7.8 9.0 6.5 8.0 
sample s.d. 'm (%) 30.0 9.9 10.5 16.0 34.3 11.1 13.6 13.1 13.7 16.8 13.7 16.8 
            
atg dma grd ktn lca vct bhs brb blz pan
1985 agriculture value added (% GDP)  5.0 28.0 17.1 9.1 15.2 19.6 2.2 6.2 20.4 8.8
1995 agriculture value added (% GDP)  3.8 20.4 10.1 5.3 10.5 14.1    ——    —— 20.7 8.4
1985 exports (% GDP)  88.6 36.5 43.0 55.4 55.9 73.0 64.8 67.8 48.5 68.6
1995 exports (% GDP)  85.9 46.8 45.4 49.6 67.6 53.1    ——    —— 49.8 100.7
1985 gross investment (% GDP)      —— 28.5 26.6 30.3 21.0 28.0 19.2 15.4 21.6 15.2
1995 gross investment (% GDP)  46.7 32.6 32.1 46.0 19.0 33.2    ——    —— 20.0 30.3
1985 total external debt (% GDP)      —— 55.1 40.7 16.4 10.6 22.0    —— 38.1 56.6 88.1
1995 total external debt (% GDP)      —— 44.6 40.8 24.2 22.6 78.4    —— 34.3 44.0 79.4
sample s.d. 'y (%)  3.56 6.07 5.57 3.61 7.2 5.22 6.84 3.76 1.0 4.46
sample s.d. 'p (%) 3.42 4.57 4.13 4.46 4.81 3.33 2.17 4.32 0.97 4.09
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 1999. 'y: GDP growth rate; 'p: inflation; 'm: money supply growth rate22
Table 4: Common Currency Effects on Trade Intensity in the CFA 
The dependent variable is ln(1+T); the regression also includes country fixed effects. 
variable    coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio  ptl. R
2 coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio  ptl. R
2





j  +0.60948  0.44724  +1.36  0.0261  +0.74544  0.35529  +2.10  0.0900 
ai·aj   -0.17426  0.15384  -1.13  0.0259         
ifbij  +1.52930  0.45887  +3.33  0.2178  +1.45650  0.49910  +2.92  0.3100 
ifcij  +0.09240  0.58497  +0.16  0.0005         
dstij  -0.67841  0.78537  -0.86  0.0179  -0.72519  0.41628  -1.74  0.1000 
ifsij  -0.61079  0.83264  -0.73  0.0104         
ifs·dstij   -0.23643  0.58419  -0.40  0.0035         
ifs:ifcij  +1.08890  0.46108  +2.36  0.1050  +0.92816  0.33192  +2.80  0.2000 
                  
R
2   +0.90193       +0.89768      
                 
NORM   +1.99250        +2.50240       
SC   +0.56959       +0.35810      
HQ   +0.14819       +0.01697      
AIC   -0.12712        -0.20590       
Table 5: RESET Tests for Functional Form Specification (All Equations) 
CFA Equation   Unrestricted  Model   Restricted  Model 
ln(1+T)    F(3,53) = 0.88303 [0.4559]       F(3,58) = 0.37202 [0.7735]    
S       F(3,56) = 0.05133 [0.9845]      no conditioning variables
V
'p       F(3,56) = 0.39742 [0.7554]    F(3,61) = 0.02746 [0.9938]    
V
'y      F(3,56) = 0.40897 [0.7472]      no conditioning variables 
ECCU Equation   Unrestricted  Model   Restricted  Model 
S       F(3,37) = 0.32188 [0.8095]    F(3,39) = 0.13441 [0.9390] 
V
'p      F(3,38) = 0.72641 [0.5426]    no conditioning variables 
V
'y      F(3,38) = 0.86249 [0.4689]    F(3,40) = 0.65188 [0.5865] 23
Table 6: Common Currency Effects on Unconditional Real Exchange Rate Volatility 
The dependent variable is S; the regression also includes country fixed effects. 
a) CFA                   
variable   coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio ptl. R
2   coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio ptl. R
2
f(gi-gj)   -0.03056  0.04360  -0.70  0.0087          
f(di–dj)   -0.00368  0.01830  -0.20  0.0004          
f(ctotij) -0.07051  0.07909  -0.89  0.0150          
ifbij  -0.09241  0.17186  -0.54  0.0052          
ifcij  +0.08370  0.18530  +0.45  0.0037          
dstij  -0.22236  0.18746  -1.19  0.0216          
ifsij   -0.29545 0.15422  -1.92 0.0629   -0.19710 0.09377 -2.100 0.0832
                 
R
2    +0.57533        +0.54916     
V   +0.36208        +0.35132     
                  
SC    -1.16519        -1.48627     
HQ    -1.54646        -1.74714     
AIC    -1.79554        -1.48627     
b) ECCU                   
variable   coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio ptl. R
2   coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio ptl. R
2
f(gi-gj) -0.03379 0.03593  -0.94 0.0265         
f(di–dj) -0.00654 0.02344  -0.28 0.0015         
dstij +0.74303 0.09503  +7.82 0.7094 +0.73502 0.09911  +7.42 0.7008
ifsij -1.50370 0.49233  -3.05 0.2780 -1.57190 0.43479  -3.62 0.2965
ifs·dstij -0.53765 0.19065  -2.82 0.3126 -0.55655 0.17279  -3.22 0.3252
                 
R
2    +0.87922        +0.87553      
V   +0.25446        +0.25012      
                   
SC    -1.87379        -2.01286      
HQ    -2.25150        -2.34022      
AIC    -2.47601        -2.53479      24
Table 7: Structural Innovation Correlations 
(For 'y above the diagonal and 'p below. *** significantly different from zero at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%)
   ben   bfa   sen   tgo   ner   cam   gab   car   tcd   civ   mli   cgo 
Ben  0.47***  0.13   0.56***  0.38**   0.52***  0.48***  0.31*   0.28  -0.58*** -0.48*** -0.50*** 
Bfa  0.74***  0.68***  0.78***  0.76***  0.69***  0.84***  0.54***  0.67*** -0.73*** -0.77*** -0.83*** 
Sen  0.72***  0.89***   0.58***  0.79***  0.56***  0.63***  0.40***  0.55*** -0.56*** -0.64*** -0.68*** 
Tgo  0.82***  0.84***  0.91***  0.85***  0.81***  0.90***  0.67***  0.77*** -0.87*** -0.93*** -0.93*** 
Ner  0.41**   0.47***  0.41**   0.50***  0.76***  0.82***  0.58***  0.65*** -0.80*** -0.83*** -0.90*** 
Cam  0.75***  0.81***  0.94***  0.89***  0.27   0.87***  0.62***  0.69*** -0.74*** -0.76*** -0.83*** 
Gab  0.75***  0.87***  0.95***  0.90***  0.39**   0.96***  0.69***  0.75*** -0.82*** -0.88*** -0.93*** 
Car  0.77***  0.84***  0.97***  0.93***  0.39**   0.95***  0.97***  0.61*** -0.42*** -0.57*** -0.66*** 
Tcd  0.67***  0.56***  0.56***  0.59***  0.25   0.63***  0.61***  0.60*** -0.61*** -0.79*** -0.80*** 
Civ  0.82***  0.89***  0.90***  0.90***  0.46***  0.91***  0.92***  0.91***  0.64***  0.86***  0.87*** 
Mli  0.74***  0.81***  0.92***  0.91***  0.47***  0.89***  0.94***  0.94***  0.66***  0.86***  0.94*** 
Cgo  0.74***  0.86***  0.94***  0.90***  0.44***  0.91***  0.92***  0.95***  0.69***  0.89***  0.91***
   atg   dma   grd   ktn   lca   vct   bhs   brb   blz   pan 
Atg  0.292   0.375**   0.631***   0.107   0.188   0.086   0.150   0.062  -0.011 
Dma  0.681***   0.006   0.234   0.200   0.309*   0.133  -0.034   0.320*  -0.249 
Grd  0.248   0.586***   0.229  -0.156   0.328*   0.316*   0.364*   0.055   0.108 
Ktn  0.454**   0.321*   0.256   0.332*  -0.036   0.122   0.162   0.248  -0.148 
Lca  0.026   0.072  -0.204   0.087   0.220   0.139   0.407**   0.289  -0.291 
Vct  0.062  -0.145   0.023   0.235  -0.209   0.132   0.008   0.326**  -0.310* 
Bhs   0.202 -0.061 -0.233   0.124 -0.107   0.132   0.283*   0.040   0.117 
Brb  0.672***   0.520***   0.503***   0.313**  -0.265  -0.191   0.142   0.006  -0.025 
Blz  0.386**   0.483***   0.487***   0.219  -0.190  -0.114  -0.177   0.579***  -0.193
Pan  0.084   0.124   0.239   0.147  -0.176  -0.169  -0.056   0.367*   0.244 25
Table 8: Identification of “Core Groups” 
The table shows the mean value of cross-country correlations in either price innovations (H1) or 
output innovations (H2) for different “core groups” of countries. Corresponding standard deviations 
(S.D.) are also shown, along with the percentage of correlations significantly greater than zero (% 
Sig.).
Core Group        Mean Corr.  S.D. Corr.  % Sig. 
CFA
Prices Group #1  ben, bfa, civ, sen, tgo, mli,  0.759    0.194    96 
    ner, cam, cgo, gab, car, tcd 
Prices Group #2  civ, sen, tgo, mli, cam, cgo,  0.921    0.026   100 
gab, car 
Output Group #1   ben, bfa, sen, tgo, ner, cam,  0.629    0.175   100 
gab, car, tcd 
Output Group #2   civ, mli, cgo       0.890    0.036   100 
Caribbean
Prices Group #1   atg, dma, grd, ktn, brb, blz,  0.377    0.174    57 
pan
Prices Group #2   atg, dma, grd, brb, blz    0.515    0.123    90 
Output Group #1   atg, dma, grd, ktn, lca, vct,  0.191    0.155    31 
bhs, brb, blz   26
Table 9: Common Currency Effects on Price Innovation Correlations 





















ln ; the regression also includes country fixed effect
a) CFA                   
variable   coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio ptl. R
2   coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio ptl. R
2
f(gi-gj)   -0.00596  0.05910  -0.10  0.0003          
f(di–dj)   -0.01703  0.02474  -0.69  0.0076          
f(ctotij) -0.11163  0.08364  -1.33  0.0355          
ifbij   +0.17574  0.20188 +0.87  0.0180  +0.27305 0.15682 +1.74  0.0705
ifcij  -0.13388  0.24138  -0.55  0.0090          
dstij   -0.16997  0.19911  -0.85  0.0123          
ifsij    -0.12549  0.18117 -0.69  0.0115  -0.05316 0.14343 -0.37  0.0037
                 
R
2    +0.89721        +0.89072      
V   +0.36864        +0.36136      
                   
SC    -1.12928        -1.38546      
HQ    -1.51055        -1.66639      
AIC    -1.75964        -1.84993      
b) ECCU                   
variable   coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio ptl. R
2   coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio ptl. R
2
f(gi-gj) -0.00684 0.05433  -0.13 0.0006         
f(di–dj) +0.02759 0.04118  +0.67 0.0071         
dstij +0.09438 0.10574  +0.89 0.0218        
ifsij +0.30846 0.26619  +1.16 0.0340 +0.19007 0.23673  +0.80 0.0171
                 
R
2    +0.68113        +0.66940      
V   +0.40176        +0.39062      
                   
SC    -1.01216        -1.22983      
HQ    -1.36470        -1.50682      
AIC    -1.57424        -1.67146      27
Table 10: Common Currency Effects on Output Innovation Correlations 





















ln ; the regression also includes country fixed effects. 
a) CFA                   
variable   coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio ptl. R
2   coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio ptl. R
2
f(gi-gj)   +0.05930  0.17428  +0.34  0.0013          
f(di–dj)   +0.08774  0.09983  +0.88  0.0081          
f(ctotij) -0.28137  0.33064  -0.85  0.0093          
ifbij  +0.30777  0.82729  +0.37  0.0022          
ifcij  -1.04880  0.91432  -1.15  0.0219          
dstij   -0.38725  0.60127  -0.64  0.0026          
ifsij    -0.79082  0.59729 -1.32  0.0183  -0.29943 0.42382 -0.71  0.0081
                 
R
2    +0.37315        +0.34049      
V   +1.84044        +1.77771      
                   
SC    +2.08661        +1.75652      
HQ    +1.70534        +1.49565      
AIC    +1.45626        +1.32522      
b) ECCU                   
variable   coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio ptl. R
2   coeff.  h.c.s.e.  t ratio ptl. R
2
f(gi-gj) -0.09673 0.04159  -2.33 0.1040 -0.10970 0.04772  -2.30 0.1331
f(di–dj) -0.02171 0.06219  -0.35 0.0081         
dstij -0.09037 0.09796  -0.92 0.0261        
ifsij +0.00267 0.22070  +0.01 0.0000 +0.13202 0.21390  +0.62 0.0109
                 
R
2    +0.51306        +0.49613      
V   +0.35047        +0.34554      
                   
SC    -1.28537        -1.42037      
HQ    -1.63791        -1.72254      
AIC    -1.84744        -1.90214      28
Figure 1: The CFA Franc Zone 
The dark shaded area is the UEMOA; the light shaded area is the UDEAC. 
1 = Benin; 2 = Burkina Faso; 3 = Côte d’Ivoire; 4 = Guinea-Bissau; 5 = Mali; 6 = Niger; 7 = Senegal; 8 = Togo 
9 = Cameroon; 10 = C.A.R.; 11 = Chad; 12 = Congo Republic; 13 = Gabon; 14 = Equatorial Guinea 
Ga = Gambia; Gh = Ghana; Gu = Guinea-Conakry; L = Liberia; M = Mauritania; N = Nigeria; S = Sierra Leone 